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In the past decades, sense of control—the feeling that one is in control of one’s
actions has gained much scientific interests. Various scales have been used to measure
sense of control in previous studies, yet no study has allowed participants to create a
scale for rating their control experiences despite advances in the neighboring field of
conscious vision has been linked to this approach. Here, we examined how participants
preferred to rate sense of control during a simple motor control task by asking them
to create a scale to be used to describe their sense of control experience during the
task. Scale with six steps was most frequently created. Even though some variability
was observed in the number of preferred scale steps, descriptions were highly similar
across all participants when scales were converted to the same continuum. When we
divided participants into groups based on their number of preferred scale steps, mean
task performance and sense of control could be described as sigmoid functions of
the noise level, and the function parameters were equivalent across groups. We also
showed that task performance increased exponentially as a function of control rating, and
that, again, function parameters were equivalent for all groups. In summary, the present
study established a participant-generated 6-point sense of control rating scale for simple
computerized motor control tasks that can be empirically tested against other measures
of control in future studies.
Keywords: sense of agency, sense of control, motor control, measuring scale, subjective experience,
consciousness, awareness
INTRODUCTION
In our daily life, we perform goal-directed actions and typically have a sense of being in control of
those actions—of being the agent that performs the actions. As pointed out by Synofzik et al. (2008),
this low-level subjective experience of being in control of an action is different from a higher order
judgment of being an agent. This conscious sense of agency or sense of control has received much
scientific interest over the last decades (Haggard et al., 2002; Metcalfe and Greene, 2007; David et al.,
2008), yet the research is still ongoing and several aspects are still unresolved.
One aspect of general importance to the study of sense of control is how it is best measured. How
canwe know if we can trust the results of our experiments if we are not certain that themeasures used
to estimate the sense of control are optimal? Previous studies have used very differentmeasures of the
experience of control, but no studies have examined how participants prefer to report their control
experience, and only very few have been concerned with scale generation. As an exception to this
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general rule, Polito et al. (2013) constructed a new measure for
quantifying alterations in agency in a hypnotic state, which they
termed the sense of agency rating scale (SOARS). The SOARS
consisted of 10 items describing the experience of being an agent,
and users were to rate each statement on a 7-point Likert scale (1
being “strongly disagree” to 7 being “strongly agree”). However,
since SOARS was specifically developed to quantify agency in
hypnotic context, it cannot be applied as a measure of sense of
control in the majority of agency research. The general absence
of sense of control scale literature is, in a sense, surprising given
the amount of research conducted on participant constructed
measures of awareness and comparison of measures of awareness
in general in neighboring fields of consciousness research such
as visual awareness (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004; Persaud et al.,
2007; Persaud andMcLeod, 2008; Sandberg et al., 2010, 2011) and
artificial grammar knowledge (Persaud et al., 2007; Dienes and
Seth, 2010; Wierzchoń et al., 2012).
Current experimental measures of sense of agency/control
are highly diverse, yet two general approaches can be
distinguished. These are implicit and explicit measures of sense of
agency/control. Implicit measures of agency include intentional
binding and the kinematics of a movement. The intentional
binding paradigm captures how having a sense of agency affects
the temporal relation between actions and effects. Haggard et al.
(2002) proposed that the perceived timing of an external effect is
shifted earlier if and only if the effect is preceded by a voluntary
action with the intention to trigger such an effect. Kinematics
of a movement reflects the relationship between the motor
monitoring mechanism and an underlying action command that
one cannot report verbally. In this sense, kinematics of movement
can be used to demonstrate goal-directed behavior in the absence
of awareness. For example, Fourneret and Jeannerod (1998)
suggested that this type of sense of agency measure is able to
capture the ability to adjust movement subtly in response to small
deviations of an action outcome. This subtle adjustment in motor
commands may otherwise go unnoticed by researchers because
the person carrying out such an action may largely be unaware of
them.
Explicit judgments of sense of agency, on the other hand,
are typically assessed in paradigms using free or forced choice
button presses or simple movements (rotation of a joystick, a
finger tapping movement or following an object on the screen
with the mouse) as the primary task. Following the primary
task, participants are asked to indicate the degree to which they
feel control over a certain action (Wegner et al., 2004; Linser
and Goschke, 2007; Metcalfe and Greene, 2007) or to contribute
a visual action effect to a particular agent, e.g., to themselves,
the computer or another person (Aarts et al., 2005; Sato and
Yasuda, 2005). Typically, these judgments are made on rating
scales (10- or 100-point) ranging from “notme at all” to “definitely
me,” or from “no control at all” to “complete control.” In other
studies, participants are given pre-defined statements about their
agency experience to rate using a Likert scale ranging from
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” (five and seven steps being
most common; Ma and Hommel, 2015). Another type of agency
judgments typically involve self-other attribution, i.e., participants
make “Yes” or “No” responses to indicate whether the images of
a movement displayed on a computer screen reflects their own
movement spatially and temporally (Farrer et al., 2003).
It is nevertheless difficult to judge which measure to use as
scales have not been directly compared. It has been argued that
a measure of conscious experience should be both exclusive and
exhaustive (Reingold andMerikle, 1988). Ameasure is considered
exclusive when it does not mistake unconscious processing for
conscious processing. It could, for instance, be argued that if sense
of control was estimated only by how well an action is performed
then all accurate, but unattended and unconscious movements
will bemisclassified as reflecting a high sense of control. However,
a goodmeasure of awareness should not only avoid misclassifying
unconscious processes as conscious, it should also ensure that
all conscious processes are reported, or in the context of motor
control that all feelings of control are reported. That is, it should be
optimally exhaustive. An example of suboptimal exhaustiveness is
when ameasure fails to capture weak experiences and erroneously
finds above-chance accuracy when no sense of control is reported,
thus misclassifying a partially conscious movement as entirely
unconscious.
For visual awareness, various measures have been compared
including an introspective awareness measure (the perceptual
awareness scale, PAS) generated by participants in amasked visual
identification study (Ramsøy andOvergaard, 2004). PAS has been
compared to more indirect measures of awareness—confidence
ratings and post-decision wagering (Sandberg et al., 2010). The
exhaustiveness of the measures was estimated using two common
procedures. First, the task accuracy was estimated at the reports
of no awareness, no confidence, or the lowest willingness to
wager on being correct—i.e., the subjective threshold of each
measure was established (Sidis, 1898). The scale with the lowest
accuracy at the subjective threshold was considered to be most
exhaustive—i.e., participants are willing/able to report even
weak experiences. Second, the correlation between accuracy and
awareness was estimated as a typical measure of awareness—i.e.,
the participants are not only willing to report awareness, but
the awareness ratings are meaningfully related to accuracy. In
the study, PAS performed better than the other two measures in
both analyses, and additionally the awareness ratings were used
more consistently across different stimulus durations (Sandberg
et al., 2010). Some of the key findings of this study were recently
replicated (Wierzchoń et al., 2014).
In the study presented below, our goal was to introduce and
internally validate a similar participant-developed measure of
sense of control for use in noisy movement tasks to be compared
against other measures in future studies. Specifically, our
participants each created a scale to describe their subjective sense
of control over a goal-directed noisymouse cursormovement, and
the number of scale steps and the descriptions of control for each
step was compared across participants. Subsequently for analyses,
participants were divided into three groups based on the number
of scale steps they preferred, and the influence of group on the
accuracy-control relationship was examined. Overall, participants
gave highly similar descriptions of scale steps, and using
equivalence testswe found that the task performance (asmeasured
by the Euclidean distance between final cursor position and target
location in a pixel-based unit)—sense of control relationship was
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equivalent for all groups. For this reason, a single sense of control
scale was created based on reports of all participants, what we have
called the “SCS”. We believe this scale can be used in similar tasks,
and the procedure for creating the scale may be used for scale
creation in different experimental paradigms.
EXPERIMENT 1
Themain goal of Experiment 1was to investigate how participants
preferred to report their sense of control (specifically how many
scale steps were preferred and how each scale step might be
described), and whether the preferred scale had an impact on the
performance-control relationship. To investigate this, participants
were asked to construct a scale to measure their sense of motor
control over a simple noisy mouse cursor movement.
Methods
Participants
Thirty-five healthy participants [13 males; mean age 24 years
(18–37); all right-handed] with normal or corrected-to-normal
vision were recruited. All participants gave informed consent
after reading an information sheet describing their rights as
participants as well as the experiment, and they were debriefed
afterward. During the debriefing, one participant expressed
misunderstanding of the experiment (rating task difficulty rather
than sense of control) and was subsequently removed from all
analyses. Three other participants were excluded from the curve
analysis due to insufficient number of trials with finalized rating
scale (see Results, for a detailed description). Simple behavioral
experiments such as the one reported here do not require ethical
approval under Danish law, specifically Komitéloven x7 and x8.1.
Stimuli and Procedure
Participants were seated at a desk facing a LED monitor with a
display frequency of 60 Hz at a distance of approximately 60 cm.
They performed a simple motor task (Figure 1). The background
color was light gray with a luminance of 80% of screen maximum,
and the target was a red dot [RGB value: (255, 0, 0)] with a size of
approximately 0.2°of visual angle. On each trial, participants were
asked to press any key when ready to start the trial. Next, a fixation
cross appeared at the center of the screen for 50 ms followed
by the target appearing at a random location on the screen for
500 ms. When the target disappeared, participants had 2000 ms
to move a cursor from the center of the screen to the remembered
target location using a mouse. Task performance was measured
as the Euclidean distance between final cursor position and target
location in a pixel-based unit.
On a given trial, one of two types of noise was added to the
cursor movement. The purpose of using two noise types was to
avoid ratings of sense of control being tied to one particular noise
type. For both noise types, it was ensured that an increase in
noise would have a detrimental effect on performance, and that
performance would cover the entire possible range from floor
(i.e., behavioral response has no impact on accuracy) to ceiling
(participants are as accurate as they can be). For both noise types,
the velocity of the cursor was affected, and the cursor bounced
back upon hitting the edge of the screen. Noise was triggered by
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the motor movement paradigm. After initiation
of the trial, a fixation appeared briefly followed by a red target presented for
500 ms. After the target disappeared, participants were instructed to move
the mouse cursor to the remembered target location within 2 s. Cursor
movement was affected by varying levels of noise. At the end of each trial,
participants were asked to write down their experience. Participants were
instructed to create a scale to report experiences by the end of the first block
(of 4) and update this scale over the course of the experiment if necessary.
movement of the cursor by the participant and could influence
cursor movement in any direction with a random delay (non-
uniform) of 1–250 (mean = 16.67) milliseconds. For one type of
noise, the movement of the cursor was affected linearly in one
direction, and for the other type of noise, the movement of the
cursor was affected by a sine wave movement toward one general
direction. For each noise type, there were six levels of computer
interference/noise ranging from no noise at all (0% interference,
all participant input) to complete noise (cursor movement was
completely driven by the computer and no participant input,
100% interference) in steps of 20%. At the end of each trial,
participants were asked to evaluate how much control over the
cursormovement they experienced using the guidelines described
in the paragraph below. Finally, the participants initiated the
next trial by pressing a button on the keyboard. All participants
completed four blocks with 72 trials in each block, a total of 288
trials.
Scale Development
Participants were given written and verbal instructions on how to
generate a scale to describe their experience of control over the
cursor movement. They were informed that after each trial, they
would be asked to evaluate how much control they experienced
over the cursor movement they had just carried out. The end
goal of the task was to construct a scale with which they
were comfortable reporting their sense of control over cursor
movement. Participants were suggested to perform this task in
steps, e.g., first take downnotes after each trial recordingwhat type
of experience it was, after they have an idea of what to expect in the
task, they could start constructing a sketchy scale with scale points
and corresponding descriptions. The end result scale should be a
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scale with as many points as necessary to describe their subjective
experience but nomore than needed. Participants were instructed
to have a preliminary scale after the first block (72 trials) and
update the number of scale steps and the scale step descriptions,
if necessary, over the course of the remaining three blocks (216
trials).
Statistical Analyses
The data were analyzed using R version 3.1.2 (non-linear
regression models) and Stata 14 (random coefficient models).
Random coefficient models were used to estimate the relationship
between control ratings and performance, and non-linear
regression models were model performance and control ratings
as sigmoid functions of noise level. To ensure comparability
between the scales created by all participants, all scales were
transformed to start at 1 and end at 6, which was the most
commonly chosen number of scale points. The details of the
analyses and the transformation are reported in the Appendix.
Equivalence Tests
As we were particularly interested in examining whether the
relationship between the performance and the control ratings
was similar across groups, equivalence tests were performed. In
brief, these tests allow us to accept/reject whether a difference
between two groups is within certain equivalence limits. An in-
depth explanation of these tests and our chosen limits for the tests
is reported in the Appendix.
Results
Scale Point Distribution
We first examined the distribution of the number of scale points
participants constructed (i.e., how many scale steps participants
found to be necessary and sufficient to report their experience).
As seen in Figure 2A, the distribution was right skewed, and the
number of scale points ranged from 3 to 20 with the majority
finalizing their rating scale at 6 points (i.e., the mode was
6). Histogram inspection of log-transformed number of scale
step data indicated that the distribution was log-normal. The
geometric mean was 6.66 [95% CI (5.84; 7.60)]. Overall, the most
frequently preferred scale thus consisted of six steps, but some
variability was observed.
A main goal of the study was to create a single scale for use in
similar experimental paradigms in future studies, yet participants
spontaneously selected different numbers of scale points. In order
to examine whether these scales were comparable and could
meaningfully be collapsed to a single, most commonly preferred
scale, we compared the relationship between accuracy in the
motor task as a function of ratings of control for all participants:
those preferring six steps, those preferring fewer, and those
preferring more. This division resulted in three groups: group 1
consisted of seven participants who created rating scales with less
than 6 rating points; group 2 consisted of 10 participants who
created a 6-point scale, and group 3 consisted of 14 participants
who created scales with more than 6-points to describe their
subjective experience.While the majority of participants finalized
their rating scale after the first block, leaving three blocks for
analyses, three modified the number of steps in their scale
FIGURE 2 | Distribution of preferred number of scale steps. Bar charts
showing the distribution of the number of steps on the scales created by the
34 participants in Experiment 1 (A) and 12 participants in Experiment 2 (B).
Both distributions were well described by a log-normal distribution and had a
mode of 6.
throughout all four blocks. This gave insufficient number of
blocks (0–1) after finalizing their scale for meaningful analyses,
and they were therefore excluded from further analyses. In
order to compare the relationship between task performance and
subjective ratings across groups, we transformed all experience
ratings to fit a scale ranging from 1 to 6 as described in the Section
“Methods.”
Accuracy as a Function of Control Rating
The relationship between performance and sense of control
rating was examined using random coefficient models. As the
relationship appeared exponential, the distance to target data
was log transformed, and Q–Q plot and residual plot inspection
did not contradict this relationship. Log (distance to target)
was modeled as a linear function of group (between-participant
categorical variable) and the interaction between group and
converted rating (within-participant continuous variable). The
intercept was set at sense of control = 1. Participant number was
modeled as a random effect. Interestingly, the functions for each
group were highly similar, and no significant difference was found
between groups [2(2)= 1.58, p= 0.45]. The resulting models for
each group are plotted in Figure 3. The result was qualitatively
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FIGURE 3 | Relationship between converted sense of control rating
and distance to target. Scatter plot showing mean distance to target as a
function of the converted sense of control rating for each group (logarithmic
y-axis). Lines represent random coefficient model fits for each group. Note
that the linear fit implies that distance to target decreases exponentially as a
function of sense of control rating.
unchanged when noise level was included in the model as an
independent variable [2(2) = 0.88, p = 0.65]. For group 1, the
geometric mean of the intercept value was 148 [95% CI: (125;
176)]. For group 2, the geometric mean of the intercept value was
154 [95% CI: (133; 179)]. For group 3, the geometric mean of the
intercept value was 151 [95% CI: (133; 170)].
Equivalence tests were performed with the mean slope value
(0.59) as the limit (see Methods). The intercept was 0.039 [90%
CI: ( 0.16; 0.24) lower for group 1 than for group 2, and the
hypothesis of non-equivalence was rejected (p = 0.0001)]. The
intercept was 0.016 [90% CI: ( 0.17; 0.20) lower for group 1
than for group 3, and the hypothesis of non-equivalence was
rejected (p < 0.0001)]. The intercept was 0.024 [90% CI: ( 0.19;
0.14) higher for group 2 than for group 3, and the hypothesis of
non-equivalence was rejected (p< 0.0001)].
For group 1, the slope was  0.56 [95% CI: ( 0.66;  0.47)].
For group 2, the slope was  0.57 [95% CI: ( 0.65;  0.48)]. For
group 3, the slope was  0.62 [95% CI: ( 0.69;  0.56)]. In other
words, for group 1, an increase in sense of control rating of 1
corresponded to a decrease of 43% (37%; 48%) in distance to
target. For group 2, the corresponding value was 43% (38%; 48%).
For group 3, distance to target was reduced by 46% (43%; 50%) as
sense of control increased by 1 rating step. Equivalence tests were
performed with 50% of the mean slope value (0.59 0.5= 0.295)
as the limit (see Methods). The slope was 0.0038 [90% CI: ( 0.10;
0.11)] larger for group 1 than for group 2, and the hypothesis of
non-equivalence was rejected (p < 0.005). The slope was 0.062
[90% CI: ( 0.038; 0.16)] larger for group 1 than for group 3, and
the hypothesis of non-equivalence was rejected (p < 0.01). The
slope was 0.058 [90% CI: ( 0.032; 0.15)] larger for group 2 than
for group 3, and the hypothesis of non-equivalence was rejected
(p< 0.005).
In conclusion, the relationship between task performance and
converted (i.e., relative) sense of control rating was described by
highly similar exponential functions across groups, and tests with
conservative limits found the models to be equivalent.
Curve Fitting (Non-Linear Regression)
Four-parameter sigmoid functions were fitted to the distance-to-
target data (the performance curve) and to the sense-of-control
data (the rating curve) for each participant using the non-linear
regression model described above. The parameters of the non-
linear regression model are shown with 95% confidence intervals
in Table 1, and the group curves are shown in Figure 4 (see
Figures A1 and A2, for individual participant curves). Note
that for all groups, mean distance to target and mean control
rating develop meaningfully as a function of noise level (i.e.,
more noise leads to larger distance to target and lower sense of
control).
No parameter differed statistically significantly between groups
for either sense of control or task performance curves (p> 0.23 for
all comparisons). As we were specifically interested in establishing
that the differences in the c parameter did not show large
variation between groups, equivalence tests were performed as
described in theMethods. Specifically, we tested if the lag between
performance and control curves varied by no more than 30%
noise across groups. The difference in performance-control lag
was 7.25% [90% CI: ( 6.9; 21.4) smaller for group 1 than for
group 2, and the hypothesis of non-equivalence was rejected
(p= 0.006)]. The difference in performance-control lagwas 0.50%
[90% CI: ( 15.0; 16.0) larger for group 1 than for group 3, and
the hypothesis of non-equivalence was rejected (p = 0.002)]. The
difference in performance-control lag was 7.75% [90% CI: ( 7.6;
23.0) larger for group 2 than for group 3, and the hypothesis of
non-equivalence was rejected (p= 0.01)].
Taken together, these results showed that the relationships
between noise and task performance as well as sense of
control ratings were highly similar for all groups, suggesting
that subjective experience of control and task accuracy were
comparable between groups when participants were allowed
to use a scale they have constructed themselves. For this
reason, analyses of scale step descriptions were performed for all
participants as a whole.
Scale Description
We analyzed the descriptions associated with each scale step for
two reasons: (1) It would allow us to examine if participants
provide similar descriptions of their sense of control. (2) It would
allow us to label each step and provide a short description of the
associated sense of control. In order to examine the descriptions of
participants’ sense of control the rating descriptions were broken
down into short phrases using the key words such as “no control,”
“the cursor moves in unintended direction,” or “I can initiate
the cursor movement.” For each participant, descriptions were
categorized by converted rating. As converted ratings were not
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TABLE 1 | Sigmoid function parameters.
Parameter a b c d
Group 1 Performance 14.91 (8.12; 21.70) 235.31 (200.62; 270.00) 0.79 (0.71; 0.87) 0.18 (0.13; 0.22)
Rating 6.16 (5.16; 7.16) 0.68 ( 0.30; 1.67) 0.51 (0.41; 0.61) 0.27 (0.14; 0.40)
Group 2 Performance 18.56 (13.62; 23.51) 264.22 (216.18; 312.26) 0.87 (0.80; 0.95) 0.16 (0.12; 0.20)
Rating 5.89 (5.00; 6.79) 1.13 (0.08; 2.90) 0.54 (0.43; 0.64) 0.28 (0.13; 0.43)
Group 3 Performance 15.68 (10.94; 20.43) 256.27 (214.05; 298.50) 0.86 (0.78; 0.93) 0.18 (0.14; 0.22)
Rating 5.77 (4.93; 6.61) 0.31 ( 0.98; 1.60) 0.60 (0.48; 0.71) 0.32 (0.17; 0.47)
The relationship between distance to target (performance) and sense of control (rating) were explained as sigmoid functions of noise level. The parameters for the functions are reported
here with 95% confidence intervals.
FIGURE 4 | Task performance and control rating as functions of noise level. Task performance (distance to target in a pixel-based unit) (A) and sense of
control rating (B) plotted as functions of noise level for all groups. Group 1 (black) consisted of participants using scales with fewer than six steps, group 2 consisted
of participants using a 6-point scale, and group 3 consisted of participants using scales with more than 6-points. For groups 1 and 3, the ratings were transformed to
fit an interval scale from 1 to 6 to ensure comparability between groups. Four-parameter sigmoid functions were fitted to the data.
always integers, they were rounded up/down when needed. The
results are plotted in Figure 5.
Interim Discussion and Conclusion
Experiment 1 demonstrated that when asked to describe their
feeling of control over a simple noisy movement, a large part
of participants preferred to use a 6-point scale, and the scale
preference of the remaining participants were scattered around
this value following a log-normal distribution. The experiment
also showed that despite using different rating scales, the
relationship between noise level and sense of control as well as
that between noise level and task performance were consistent
across participants. Similarly, the relationship between control
rating and task performance was consistent across participants,
and overall performance increased as a function of control rating.
An increase in sense of control rating of 1 corresponded to, on
average, a drop of 43–46% in distance to target for all three
groups (i.e., the error distance was approximately halved for each
increasing control rating). Finally, we found that participants
used highly similar written descriptions of their sense of control
and that they used these descriptions at similar levels of control.
Overall, it appeared that participants spontaneously reported
their sense of control in a highly similar manner, and we argue
that this may form the basis of a SCS created on the basis of
participant reports. We propose that such a SCS has six steps
with the labels and descriptions provided in Table 2. It should be
noted that we do not propose this scale as a universal measure of
agency, but rather as specific to the general type of task employed
here. We return to this topic of generalisability in the General
Discussion.
It should also be noted that in the experiment used to create this
scale, exactly six different noise levels were used, and one reason
for observing a 6-point SCS may have been that participants were
able to detect the six level graded changes in computer interference
in the experimental setting. Therefore, we carried out a control
experiment to examine whether this was the case.
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FIGURE 5 | Distribution of ratings for each description. Plots show the number of participants using a certain description of their experience of control as a
function of the mean control rating (e.g., 31 participants used the description “No control,” and they all used this description at scale step 1). Scales were converted
to an interval scale from 1 to 6 for all participants and converted ratings were rounded up/down subsequently. Plots are sorted by mode (row 1 plots have a mode of
1, etc.).
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TABLE 2 | Sense of control scale (SCS) including scale step descriptions.
SCS rating Scale description
1 No control Unintended direction
2 Almost no control Cursor sometimes still Heavy resistance
3 Little control Cursor jittery
4 Some control Can sometimes reach target
5 Almost full control Right direction Cursor imprecise
6 Full control
Note that the primary, most frequent descriptions (the first column of scale descriptions)
appear to be somewhat general and directly related to the experience of control whereas
the secondary, less common descriptions (the latter two column) appear to be more task
specific and more often related to cursor accuracy.
EXPERIMENT 2
The main goal of this experiment was to examine whether
participants’ preference for a 6-point SCS was independent of the
number of noise levels in the behavioral task. In this experiment,
we asked a new group of participants to perform a behavioral task
identical to that of Experiment 1, except that 36 noise levels were
used instead of 6.
Methods
Participants
A new cohort of 12 healthy participants (2 males; 19–26 years;
mean age 23; all right-handed) with normal or corrected-
to-normal vision participated. All participants gave informed
consent after reading an information sheet that states their rights
as participants and experiment information. They were also
debriefed afterward.
Stimuli and Procedure
The stimuli were identical to those in Experiment 1, except that 36
evenly spaced noise steps ranging from no noise at all to complete
noise were used. The total number of trials (288) was identical to
that used in Experiment 1 thus resulting in eight trials per noise
level versus 48 in Experiment 1.
Results
Scale Distribution
We examined the distribution of the number of scale points
participants constructed in Experiment 2. As seen in Figure 2B,
the distribution was right-skewed, and scale points ranged from 5
to 10. As in Experiment 1, the mode was 6. The number of scale
steps was log-transformed, and histogram inspection indicated
that the distribution was log-normal. The geometric mean was
6.40 [95% CI (5.51; 7.45)], which did not differ significantly
[t(46)= 0.34, p= 0.73] from the mean observed in Experiment 1
[6.66, 95% CI (5.84; 7.60)].
Interim Discussion and Conclusion
As in Experiment 1, participants in Experiment 2 typically
preferred reporting their sense of control on a 6-point rating
scale although they were exposed to 36 different noise levels
throughout the experiment. The number of scale steps thus
appears unaffected by the number of noise levels used in the
experiment.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this study, we set out to test whether it is possible to create
an explicit (or direct) measure of the subjective sense of control
in a noisy movement task. Within the framework of a specific
experimental paradigm, we believe to have done so using a very
similar procedure as what has previously been done in visual
consciousness research (Sandberg and Overgaard, 2015). Two
experiments were conducted, and, taken together, they showed
that despite observing variability in the number of scale steps
created, participants typically preferred a 6-point rating scale
when reporting their sense of control. Experiment 1 further
demonstrated that the relationship between noise level and sense
of control, as well as noise level and task performance was
highly comparable regardless of how many scale points were
developed. Consistent with this finding, participants also assigned
highly similar descriptions to the scale steps. On this basis, it
seems plausible to suggest that there is something generalizable,
shared between individuals, to this subjective experience of
having control that can be introspectively accessed, described, and
quantitatively measured.
This may be surprising as previous studies comparing
awareness scales (e.g., in vision research) have found that the
relationship between accuracy and awareness varies across scales,
and in particular that ratings of “no awareness” (or similar) do not
have the same meaning on different scales—demonstrating that
the scales indicate different degrees of unconscious processing by
the subjective threshold approach. For example, one experiment
compared the PAS, with a dichotomous scale (“not seen”/“seen”)
and found that accuracy was higher for the “not seen” rating
than for a PAS rating of 1 (“No experience”, thus indicating more
subliminal perception; Overgaard et al., 2006). Similarly, when
using the same “not seen”/“seen” scale, a patient fulfilled the
criteria for blindsight, but when using PAS, performance as a
function of awareness rating in her blind visual field followed
the same pattern as in her healthy field (Overgaard et al., 2008).
In contrast, Tunney and Shanks (2003) found that a binary
“high”/“low” confidence scale was able to detect differences
between conscious and unconscious processing in a very difficult
task (55% accuracy, chance = 50%), whereas a continuous scale
from 50 to 100 (indicating the estimated accuracy from chance to
complete certainty) was not. Dienes (2008) found that when an
easy task was used, the opposite pattern was observed. In contrast
to these previous studies, our results show that when participants
generate their own SCS, the criteria for each meaningful label
(e.g., “no control”) does not vary with the number of scale steps.
This has previously been emphasized as a general requirement for
collapsing participant-generated scales with different numbers of
scale steps into a single general scale (Sandberg and Overgaard,
2015).
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the generalisability of
the proposed SCS, across experimental paradigms has not been
tested in the present study—only the generalisability of the
performance-sense of control relationship across participants.
We have previously argued that scales for obtaining reports of
subjective experience generated for one specific context may not
be the optimal scale for another context, and if one needs the
optimal scale for a given paradigm, a similar method as presented
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here and elsewhere may be used for scale generation (Sandberg
et al., 2013; Andersen et al., 2015). Nevertheless, it should be
noted that scales created in a particular experimental context
generally work well in similar experiments (see Sandberg and
Overgaard, 2015, for an overview). For this reason, SCS might fill
a gap in current motor control research—the lack of an explicit
measuring scale to investigate the conscious sense of control. It is
also interesting on the basis that the approach used to develop SCS
resulted in consistent correlations between subjective report and
objective accuracy.
It may be noted that all participants spontaneously developed
scales containing at least three rating steps and resulted in a
gradual SCS rather than a dichotomous rating scale. This was
the case even though participants were instructed to use no more
scale points than needed to describe their control experience. This
finding may be relevant to the debate of whether consciousness
is a graded or dichotomous phenomenon (Sergent and Dehaene,
2004; Overgaard et al., 2006; Kouider et al., 2010; see Bachmann,
2000, for a historical account advocating the gradual stance).
One potential issue in sense of agency research that is also
present in the current task design is that subjective measures
do not distinguish between the evaluation of subjective, bodily
experience and judgments of task performance. The current
paradigm provided indirect feedback in that the moving cursor
was visible to the participant at any point on the trajectory. In
the literature, even more direct feedback has been given. For
example, in Miele et al. (2011), the motor task involved catching
“X”s falling from the top of the screen and avoid the “O”s by
moving a bar across the computer screen. Different types of noises
were introduced on the falling letters in order to manipulate
the amount of control that participants experience. “X”s and
“O”s disappeared upon being touched by the bar but would
continue falling below the bar, thus providing visual feedback on
performance. In addition, auditory feedback was also present, i.e.,
a “ping” sound was played each time an “X” was hit and a “pong”
sound when an “O” was touched.
It is an open question exactly how great the impact of feedback
is on ratings of control, but it is important to remember that
even if some influence is present, judgments of task performance
can be distinguished from reports of experience conceptually,
behaviorally and neurally. In vision research, for example,
participants are able to distinguish and switch between reporting
the subjective clarity of perception (which may be viewed as
the visual counterpart of sense of control) and confidence in
being correct (which is based on evaluation of task performance;
Sandberg et al., 2010; Zehetleitner and Rausch, 2013). Although
the two types of reports are correlated, and they both correlate
with objective performance, they are not identical, and important
differences are observed (Sandberg et al., 2010). Similarly,
although a strong correlation between sense of agency/control
and behavioral task performance has been reported (Metcalfe
and Greene, 2007; Metcalfe et al., 2010), neural correlates of the
two types of judgments have been dissociated. Miele et al. (2011)
observed that when participants made judgment of the amount of
control they experienced, activation in the left anterior prefrontal
cortex and right orbitofrontal cortex was increased compared
to when they made judgment of performance. Taken together,
we thus believe there are multiple reasons to believe that the
participants in our study did not simply report their perceived
accuracy. In addition, as the ratings of control were predictive of
accuracy even when taking into account the physical noise level,
the participants cannot simply have been reporting the observed
noise either.
In spite of rating scales having received much attention in
the last decade in visual consciousness and implicit learning
research, the topic has only recently started to receive attention
in the study of sense of control/agency as mentioned in the
Introduction. In addition to the scale generation study mentioned
in the introduction (Polito et al., 2013), a few studies have
also recently been published on the comparison of measures of
sense of control. For instance, one study (Ebert and Wegner,
2010) empirically examined the relationship between implicit and
explicit measures of agency in action monitoring task. While
implicit agency was assessed on a 10-point interval estimate
scale, a 7-point scale that evaluates the extent to which one’s
action caused the perceived effect examined explicit authorship
attribution. Correlation between implicit and explicit measures
was observed when the two questions were asked in the same
block but not in different blocks, suggesting that these two
agency questions may interfere with each other when assessed
simultaneously.
Therefore, Saito et al. (2015) examined the two levels of agency
in separate tasks and reported discrepancies between these two
ways of quantifying sense of agency. The study was based on the
assumption that there are two steps in agency judgment—first-
level feeling of being an agent (which is tackled by implicit
agency measures) and second-level judgment of agency (which
is reflected by explicit judgment of self-other attribution). Saito
and colleagues investigated these two levels of agency by assessing
both implicit and explicit agencymeasures in the same population
but with different tasks. A classical intentional binding task was
employed as the implicit agency task, which was assumed to
reflect participants’ ability in action regulation and perceptual
processing—aspects in feeling of agency. Subsequently, an action
monitoring task was carried out, and explicit judgment of agency
was assessed by a “Yes”/“No” self-other attribution question. No
significant correlation was found between the amount of binding
in the implicit task and explicit measure of agency, leaving several
interpretations open. The result may suggest that these two types
of agency measures reflect different agency systems, or that a
dichotomous self-other attribution question is too imprecise.
Overall, the examination and comparison of measures of
agency appears to have just started within the field of motor
control. In the neighboring field of visual awareness, a similar
scale to SCS was created by (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004),
namely, the PAS. In the original study, a positive correlation
between awareness and accuracy was demonstrated, and as
mentioned in the Introduction, a later study found that the PAS
had advantages over other rating scales (Sandberg et al., 2010).
Additionally, a recent study (Sandberg et al., 2014) compared PAS
to an implicit measure of consciousness, a so-called exclusion
task, and found that PAS might be more exhaustive as results
indicated residual awareness on trials for which exclusion tasks
indicated unconscious processing. In addition, use of the scale
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even indicated the presence of meaningful experiences in a
blindsight patient (Overgaard et al., 2008). In the present study,
we used similar experimental methods as was used in the Ramsøy
and Overgaard (2004) study, but with a much larger sample size
(5 in their main experiment vs. 47 across two experiments here).
Also, data were analyzed using methods similar to the ones used
in the Ramsøy and Overgaard (2004) study as well as more recent
methods for comparing performance and awareness as functions
of task difficulty (Sandberg et al., 2011).
It should be noted, however, that this study does not compare
the SCS created here to alternative rating scales. As elaborated in
the Introduction, the most appropriate measuring scale should be
both exclusive and exhaustive. A logical step for future studies
would thus be to compare explicit measuring scales such as the
6-point SCS to the dichotomous self-other attribution scale (“Yes”
or “No”), confidence ratings as well as indirect measures such as
intentional binding. Also, SCS may be further tested, refined and
developed by applying it to a variety of different paradigms and
tasks. Althoughmore work needs to be done in order to propose a
truly generalizable scale to measure the sense of control, we have
presented an approach and demonstrated that one can compare
the subjective experience of control between participants while
generating meaningful data from subjective reports.
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APPENDIX
This appendix contains a detailed description of the statistical
analyses, including the performed equivalence tests, as well as
plots of individual participant data. Figures A1 and A2 show
that the sigmoid functions generally describe the individual data
well. It may be noted that the sigmoid shape is less visible
for the performance curve than for the control curve. This is
because it is not as close to its theoretical maximum. From a
modeling perspective, this is nevertheless not important as a and b
parameters do not differ significantly across groups for both curve
types.
Statistical Analyses
First, we examined the distribution of the number of scale points
participants constructed. The distribution was log-normal, and
the mode of the distribution (i.e., 6) was selected as the number
of scale steps to be used in further analyses (see Results, for
details). Ratings on all other scales were transformed to fit a
scale with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 6 using a
conversion based on relative distance tomaximumandminimum.
This was done using the equation: (a   1)/(b   1)  5 + 1,
where a corresponded to the scale point to be converted
and b was the total number of scale points. For example, a
rating of 4 on an 11-point scale would be converted to 2.5
on an interval scale from 1 to 6. Following scale conversion,
participants were divided into three groups depending on the
number of scale steps they had created. Group 1 included
the participants using fewer than six steps, group 2 consisted
of participants using exactly six steps, and group 3 included
participants using more than six steps. For all group-based
analyses, only blocks following finalization of the number of
scale steps were used for each participant (the first block was
typically discarded and only the last three blocks were included).
Based on visual inspection, all three groups appeared to behave
highly similarly within each type of noise so data from the
two noise types was collapsed for all analyses to increase the
statistical power for the more theoretically interesting question
of whether participants in different groups behaved differently in
general.
To examine if any difference in scale use was present across
groups, two analyses were performed. First, the relationship
between task performance (measured as the Euclidean distance
between final cursor position and target location in a pixel-
based unit) and sense of control ratings was estimated using a
random coefficient model. Log-transformed distance to target
was the dependent variable while group and converted rating
were independent variables also adjusting for noise level.
This corresponds to a linear regression model with group
dependent slope and intercept, taking into account that the two
measurements from the same participant are positively correlated.
Noise level was adjusted for by including it as an additive
continuous explanatory variable.
Second, comparison of psychometric curves for task
performance and sense of control was performed using non-
linear regression. Estimation of awareness through comparison
of non-linear models of task accuracy and awareness has been
used in multiple studies (Sandberg et al., 2011; Windey et al.,
2013; Zehetleitner and Rausch, 2013) since it was proposed by
Koch and Preuschoff (2007). Here, we used such non-linear
regression models to describe the data. We estimated the lag
differences between curves from different groups by comparing
curve parameters. From a theoretical point of view, sigmoid
functions were expected, and the sigmoid shape was identified by
inspecting individual plots of the data. We chose the 4-parameter
sigmoid function for all the analyses because it gave a good fit to
all individual data. Furthermore, the function is very flexible and
its parameters all have interpretations relevant to the problem at
hand.
The 4-parameter sigmoid function is given by the expression
a + (b   a)/(1 + e(c   x)/d) where x denotes the noise level. a
denotes the plateau at small noise levels and b denotes the plateau
at high noise levels. c denotes the x-value of the centre point of the
slope (i.e., the point that is halfway between a and b). d is ameasure
of the steepness of the slope.Using thismodel, the lag between task
performance and sense of control can be based on the difference
in the values of the c parameter between the two functions. This
is the main parameter of interest here. The absolute values of a
and b are not important as both c and d are estimated on the basis
of x-axis values corresponding to proportional changes of values
on the y-axis, i.e., c is defined as the x-value that corresponds to
the y-value that is exactly half of the difference between a and b.
This way, comparisons between the c and/or d values can be made
between a performance curve and a sense of control curve without
the two curves sharing the same a and/or b value.
The parameters describing the sigmoid function were
estimated using non-linear mixed effects regression analysis.
More precisely, for each of the parameters a, b, c, and d, an
interaction between group and response (distance to target/sense
of control) was included as a fixed effect along with random
effects corresponding to participant and the interaction between
participant and response.
Equivalence Tests
In order to conclude that the results (given by some parameter)
for two groups are equivalent, equivalence limits are necessary.
If the true difference between the two groups (with respect
to this parameter) lies within the limits, we say that the two
groups are equivalent. An equivalence test is then performed
as two one-sided tests of the difference being equal to each
of the equivalence limits, and the corresponding p-value is
the largest of the p-values from the one-sided tests. From an
acceptance/rejection point of view this procedure is identical to
constructing the 90% confidence interval for the group difference
and reject non-equivalence (accept equivalence) if this interval is
fully contained within the equivalence limits. In other words, if
the 90% confidence interval is fully contained within the interval
defined by the two equivalence limits, both one-sided test will be
significant, and equivalence is accepted.
For analyses based on the randomeffects coefficientmodel, two
equivalence tests were performed. First, we examined whether the
interceptswere equivalent. The intercept corresponded to distance
to target for the lowest control rating (1) and thus indicated
the distance to target in the absence of control, a common
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FIGURE A1 | Task performance (distance to target) plotted as functions of noise level for each participant. Four-parameter sigmoid functions were fitted to
the data.
FIGURE A2 | Sense of control rating plotted as functions of noise level for each participant. Four-parameter sigmoid functions were fitted to the data.
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measure of unconscious performance. It should be noted that
we did not examine whether any unconscious performance was
present as such (since there was no natural chance performance
on our distance to target measure), but simply whether it was
within the same range across groups (even if this range included
no unconscious performance). We set the limit for accepting
equivalence to a difference in distance to target corresponding
to no more than what would be expected from an increase in
control of one step on the SCS. This corresponded to a value
of 0.59 for the log-transformed data, meaning that if the 90%
confidence interval of the difference in intercept across groups
did not include 0.59, we accepted equivalence (see Results, for
details).
Second, we examined slope differences. The slope could in
principle be any value from minus to plus infinity, but if control
ratings are meaningful a negative value is expected (i.e., as control
increases, distance to target is expected to be reduced). We set
the limit for the equivalence test to a value to 50% of the slope
value. With a slope of  0.59, the 90% confidence interval of
the difference in slope across groups should not include 0.295
if we were to accept equivalence. Given the sample size and
individual variability, the limits mentioned here corresponded to
mean differences across groups of no more than a few percent
of the examined values, and it may thus be considered relatively
conservative limits.
For non-linear regression analyses, the control curve was
expected to lag behind the performance curve (i.e., a difference
in c parameters were expected), and this lag has been interpreted
as an indication of subliminal processing (as control/awareness
ratings increase slower than performance). In visual awareness
experiments, this lag (i.e., c parameter difference) has been
observed to correspond roughly to the value of d parameter of
the awareness curve (corresponding to the control curve here;
Sandberg et al., 2011). In other words, if the steepness parameter
of a sigmoid function of subjective awareness reports of visual
clarity as a function of stimulus presentation time in milliseconds
has a value of 20 (ms), this curve is typically found to lag
behind the identification performance curve by 20 ms. In the
present study, the d parameter of all sense of control curves
was around 0.30 (30% points noise difference), and this was
chosen as the limit for our equivalence tests for the c parameter,
meaning that if the 90% confidence interval of the difference in
control-performance lag across groups did not include 0.3, we
accepted equivalence. In other words, we tested if the observed
differences in accuracy-control lag across groups were statistically
significantly below 0.3 (i.e., 30% noise). Given the sample size
and individual variability, this limit corresponded to mean lag
differences across groups of no more than a few percentage points
noise, and it may thus also be considered a relatively conservative
limit.
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